The debate about the implications of algorithms on competition law enforcement has so far focused on multi-firm conduct in general and collusion in particular. The implications of algorithms on abuse of dominance have been largely neglected. This article seeks to fill the gap in the existing literature by exploring how the increasingly precise practice of individualized targeting by algorithms can facilitate the practice of a range of abuses of dominance, including predatory pricing, rebates, and tying and bundling. The ability to target disparate groups of consumers with different prices helps a predator to minimize the losses it sustains during predation and maximize its ability to recoup its losses. This changes how recoupment should be understood and ascertained and may even undermine the rationale for requiring a proof of likelihood of recoupment under US antitrust law. This increased ability to price discriminate also enhances a dominant firm’s ability to offer exclusionary rebates. Finally, algorithms allow dominant firms to target their tying and bundling practices to loyal customers, hence avoiding the risk of alienating marginal customers with an unwelcome tie. This renders tying and bundling more feasible and effective for dominant firms.

In the majority of cartel research firms are regarded as collective entities and the formation and breakdown of cartels are typically explained by firms’ incentives and corresponding market conditions. While this approach has provided lots of valuable insights, it disregards one crucial aspect: In reality, cartels are not formed by firms, but by people who need to trust each other in order to overcome the inherent risks of participating in anti-competitive agreements. In our recent research “On the Sociology of Cartels” we address this topic by analysing 15 German cartels regarding the characteristics of individual members, their communication methods, the internal organisation and the eventual breakup. This research is complemented by an experimental paper that studies cooperation with negative externalities, as it is usually the case in cartels, focusing on the role of gender, information and various psychological traits. Our results indicate that homogeneity of participants plays a central role for cooperation and cartel formation which has practical implications for competition policy and policies aimed at diversity.

Zero-Rating agreements are those that provides users with access to mobile servicesand applications without charging for the data used. Even though it may seem as a welfare enhancing strategy for the consumer, the scheme also has its shortcomings. I argue that zero rating is a policy that presents both economic and non-economic harms, particularly in poorer countries that rely heavily on cellular data. By conducting a case study of Brazil, I point to the failings of zero-rating and its socioeconomic harms. I propose a concerted strategy to tackle the issue, addressing it through several governmental actions.

This paper presents a model where the managers of two firms decide about adopting a sustainable production technology (or product). It demonstrates under what conditions a firm experiences a first-mover disadvantage from going green, which may potentially be overcome by a sustainability agreement serving as a device for equilibrium selection in a coordination game with multiple equilibria. If the technology adoption game is, however, a prisoner’s dilemma, the sustainability agreement must be structured like a hardcore cartel.