2025
Competition Policy in South Africa: From 1994 to Now. Two competing approaches in South African competition policy: merger control and anti-cartel enforcement over three decades (WPS01/2025)
This paper examines the evolution of South African competition policy since the Competition Act of 1998, focusing on merger control and anti-cartel enforcement. Using a Bayesian decision-theoretic framework, the analysis evaluates whether enforcement trends are driven by research and policy experience or by shifting policy preferences. The findings reveal two divergent paths: merger control has become significantly more interventionist with broader theories of harm, largely driven by changing policy preferences rather than empirical evidence; meanwhile, anti-cartel enforcement expanded rapidly before stabilising, with its growth primarily supported by learning effects and international practices, though recent novel interpretations of collusion also reflect preference shifts. The paper identifies tensions between these approaches—one evolving based on economic literature and international precedent, the other shaped by policymaker preferences. It concludes that competition policy dominated by preferences rather than systematic, evidence-based evolution may undermine effective competition enforcement, even when pursuing broader objectives beyond economic efficiency.
Capacity Collusion and Overcharge Estimation (WPS02/2025)
Prof. Willem H. Boshoff and Dr. Thomas Fagart
Collusion may change price dynamics prior to and, especially, following a formal period of coordination. This paper presents a dynamic model of capacity choice under partial irreversibility to study the implications of a capacity cartel on price dynamics and damage estimates. We study both transitory pre- and post-cartel adjustment effects as well as a long-run effect and find that collusion damage continues after the cartel ends, and may persist indefinitely when demand remains constant. These effects imply biased estimates of cartel overcharge by both dummy-variable and forecasting methods, both of which rely on data during and after the collusion.
Sustainability, Competition, and Decision-Making Under Uncertainty: A Bayesian Approach to Green Merger Analysis in South Africa (WPS03/2025)
Prof. Willem H. Boshoff and Katherine Stainton
This paper develops a Bayesian decision-making framework to assist South African competition authorities in evaluating anti-competitive mergers that generate environmental efficiencies. As the urgency of climate change and environmental sustainability grows, competition regulators increasingly confront the complex task of evaluating green efficiencies claimed in merger transactions while maintaining their core mandate of protecting competition. South Africa’s competition regime, which explicitly incorporates public interest considerations alongside traditional competitive assessments, provides a unique context for examining this issue. Building on Boshoff’s (2014) application of Bayesian techniques to market definition, this research extends the probabilistic treatment of classification errors to merger review decisions. Through theoretical development and empirical application to the Pioneer/Pannar Seeds merger case, this research demonstrates how Bayesian decision theory can provide a more structured and transparent approach to evaluating environmental efficiencies under uncertainty. The framework offers practical tools for competition authorities navigating the challenges of integrating sustainability considerations into merger analysis while contributing to broader academic discussions about the role of competition law in advancing environmental objectives.